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As a trial lawyer-a plaintiffs' trial lawyer-one works on behalf of
clients who have been injured or harmed by the negligence or wrongful
actions of others. Most of these clients are injury "victims" who are
crippled or debilitated, frequently poor or middle class, unable to afford
legal representation, and unable to unlock other doors to justice. For
these people, and for their concerned families and loved ones, the plain-
tiffs' lawyer provides a remedy-by obtaining financial compensation for
economic losses and pain and suffering, and by securing, on a more
philosophical or idealistic level, some measure of justice. When the
plaintiffs' attorney is successful in proving to the jury, judge or appropri-
ate societal institution that a given defendant is liable and therefore obli-
gated to compensate the plaintiff accordingly, the client is recompensed.
Similarly, the attorney, who is frequently rendering legal services on a
contingent fee basis, is also remunerated after a determination of the
defendant's liability.' When the plaintiffs' attorney is not successful, the
injured party is left to their own resources, and the attorney receives
nothing. 2 This is the nature of the role of the plaintiffs' attorney in our
civil justice system.
Although this system has served society for two hundred years, it is
under fierce attack today by the wealthy and powerful insurance industry
and related special interests. 3 These special interest groups have
launched an assault on the civil justice system, in this author's opinion,
to reap higher profits and to further enrich their already crammed trea-
suries. They are not, as they contend, motivated by altruism or neces-
sity. On the contrary, there is a great discrepancy between reality and
the insurance industry's perception of reality.
Unfortunately, it is the insurance industry's perception of reality
that has recently prevailed in state legislatures across the country. 4 The
purpose of this paper is to expose some of the inaccuracies and fallacies
* B.B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1959; J.D., Wisconsin Law School, 1961. Mr.
Habush is Immediate Past President of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. This
article was adapted from a speech presented at the National Conference of the American
Bar Association in New York City, N.Y. on August 9, 1986.
1. For a thorough discussion of the contingent fee, see Schmidt, Contingent Fee: Key to
the Courthouse, 92 CASE & COM. 2 (1987).
2. Id.
3. See generally, The Truth Behind the Insurance Panic, 72 A.B.A.J. 36 (1986) (discussing
several proposals to overhaul the tort system and various aspects of tort reform relative to
medical malpractice, legal malpractice, municipal liability and product liability).
4. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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propagated by the insurance lobby, and to demonstrate how the tort
system, although imperfect, operates as an efficient and indispensable
tool, of enormous significance to our American system and values.
I. COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Several of my colleagues, members of that loyal opposition which
comprise the defense bar, are not reserved in their critical commentary
on American tort law. 5 Such commentators claim that the current tort
system is not the proper way to deliver benefits to injured people. And
they have not wavered from this position for the last two decades.
Although such discordant views are certainly worthy of respect and
study, they are not necessarily worthy of acceptance.
One of the techniques employed by critics of our tort system has
been to rely upon anecdotal references or headline-grabbing
"buzzwords" in order to emphatically disparage our present system. In-
deed, rhetoric has been a common tactic among some critics. However,
those who have gone so far as to attach the label "lottery" to the civil
justice system's delivery of compensatory benefits 6 have grossly miscon-
strued the factors that cause people to make use of the tort system. This
term "lottery" connotes that people become involved in personal injury
litigation in order to win a prize. People who have suffered spinal cord
injuries, brain damage, disfigurement, or other serious injuries do not
consider their unfortunate situation as an opportunity to win a prize.
These victims seek redress. They simply employ the tort system to ad-
dress the devastating effects such injuries have had upon their lives.
Contrary to the "lottery" notion, the overwhelming majority of tort vic-
5. Two of the most well-known and prolific defense-oriented commentators are Jef-
fery O'Connell and Victor E. Schwartz.
Mr. O'Connell is the John Allen Love Professor of Law at the University of Virginia.
See, e.g. O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for Personal Injury, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
17(1986); O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault " Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Post-
accident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 903-04 (1985) (case study of an insurance
contract that provides no-fault coverage for catastrophically injured high school athletes);
O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L.
REV. 1267 (1984); O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 589 (1982)
(discussing restrictions on personal injury claims).
Mr. Schwartz is a noted author, lecturer and product liability defense lawyer. He is
also coauthor of W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
(7th ed. 1982). For a better understanding of the views of Mr. Schwartz, see Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Law: Hearing on S. 2631 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-13 (1982) (statement of Victor
E. Schwartz, Counsel to the Product Liability Alliance). Mr. Schwartz argues that product
liability laws are unfair to plaintiffs because legitimate claims may be barred by "the snafu
of product liability laws" and, also, unfair to defendants who are held liable in situations
where the product is misused. He concludes by advocating federal uniform standards for
product liability law. Id. at 10.
6. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTrERY-ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN (1979).
See also Andresky, A World Without Insurance?, FORBES, July 15, 1985, at 40 (citing statistics
which reflect a profound increase in filings of civil suits, the authors state: "Americans now
seem to look on a civil suit against a corporation or municipality as a kind of lottery-a
lottery to be played whenever they can."). For Mr. Schwartz's current views on this subject
see Schwartz and Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution For Product Liability Crises: Uniform Federal
Tort Law Standards, infra pp. 685-702.
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tims would trade almost any amount of money for the restoration of
their health and the dignity of a normal existence.
A. Adjudicative Efficiency: Facts About the Civil Justice System
Although spokespersons for the insurance industry and the defense
bar are oftentimes critical of the civil justice system's level of efficiency,
recent studies by Professor Marc Galanter, 7 of the University of Wiscon-
sin Law School, and surveys included in a new book on the American
jurys prove beyond doubt that the United States tort system is efficient.
Consider the facts. Ninety-eight percent of all property/casualty claims
are settled without trial.9 Only four of ten thousand claims are tried to
conclusion,' 0 and only one of every ten thousand reaches the appellate
level. 1 1 Furthermore, the occasional excessive jury award is subject to
the scrutiny of the trial judge and the appellate courts. And this scrutiny
does serve to reduce exorbitant awards. In fact, detailed analyses show
that the larger the original verdict, the larger the percentage reduction
and the lesser the net award. 12 Final judgments, arrived at after some
post-judgment reduction (whether by agreement of the parties or by or-
der of the court), are significantly less than original verdicts and appear
to award the most worthy victims the greatest amounts. 13 Post-trial set-
tlements also serve to reduce the unevenness of verdict amounts by de-
creasing, more than proportionately, some of the unusually high
original awards. 14 With very few exceptions this process corrects the un-
usual, the bizarre, or the unfair verdict. In these aspects the tort system
is working.
Critics also complain about the quantity of litigation supposedly
overburdening our judiciary and drastically increasing the cost of doing
business. 15 However, new studies have emerged that thoroughly dis-
7. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REX'. 4, 61-71
(1983) (arguing that the view of Americans as being unusually litigious is based more on
myth than careful analysis of the data).
8. J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA, (1987).
9. See Bailey, Managing Litigation, BEST'S REVIEW, Feb. 1985, at 62, col. 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS OF MILLION DOLLAR VER-
DICTS at i-ii (1986) [hereinafter MILLION DOLLAR VERDICTS]. Of 198 cases returning plain-
tiffs' verdicts which totalled $790.6 million, the actual amount paid out-after remittitur or
other post-judgment reduction or settlement- was $339.9 million. This amount repre-
sents forty-three percent of the original verdict amounts. Additionally, these post-judg-
ment reductions decreased by four percent for every additional $1.0 million of the original
verdict amount.
13. Id. at ii. For example, 22 paralysis victims received an average verdict of $4.1
million and an average settlement of $3.7 million; 37 brain damaged plaintiffs averaged
$3.7 million and $2.3 million, and nine amputation cases averaged $3.5 million and $2.0
million respectively. d.
14. Id. at iii.
15. One of the most prominent critics has been former Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger:
In 1953 there were 279 authorized federal judgeships; today there are 647....In
1953 district court filings were about 99,000; there were about 3,200 courts of
19881
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credit the notion that our court system is crumbling under a "litigation
explosion."' 16 These studies are in accord that the filing of cases in the
United States has not increased to an extent that could be even remotely
described as an "explosion." For example, data drawn from twenty
states, comprising twenty-nine limited and general jurisdiction, state-
wide court systems, revealed a moderate fourteen percent increase in
filings for tort, contract and real property claims between 1978 and
1981, but a four percent decrease for such claims between 1981 and
1984.17 Clearly the critics are confused about any "explosion."
B. Sources of Misperceptions: Media, Lawyers and the Insurance Industry
Despite credible evidence of an efficient tort system, the public per-
ception of personal injury cases is distorted, exaggerated and untrue.18
In part, this is probably because most Americans have little exposure to
actual personal injury cases or personal injury lawyers. Instead, they
rely on what they see, read, or hear in the media for information about
such cases and lawyers. What they get from the media is an incomplete
and distorted picture. 19 Additionally, the public reads only about the
filing of multimillion-dollar lawsuits, and assumes that such suits are the
norm. Unfortunately these casual observers do not follow the same
cases to final disposition; the public is rarely informed (by the same me-
appeals filings. Currently there are nearly 240,000 district court filings and
28,000 courts of appeals filings....
Address of ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger discussing the state of the judiciary. Presented
to the midyear meeting of the American Bar Association in New Orleans, Louisiana on
February 6, 1983 (reprinted in Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A.J.
442, at 443 (1983)).
16. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: AN-
NUAL REPORT 1984 173, at 176-77 (1986) [hereinafter STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS];
see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAFFORDABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE (1986).
As to the cost of doing business, see DANIELS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: STORM ON THE HORI-
ZON? (American Bar Foundation, Seminar 11, Feb. 8, 1986) (demonstrating that punitive
damages are not routinely assessed in cases where the plaintiff wins money); The Manufac-
tured Crisis, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1986, at 544. Although filings of product liability
cases in federal courts have increased, damage claims linked to asbestosis victims account
for thirty-one percent of such cases. (Of 13,554 product liability cases, 4,239 involved
asbestosis claims.) This increase is not startling because the consequences of long-term
exposure to asbestos take years to become apparent. Id. at 546.
17. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 16, 173 (1986).
18. Have Anecdotes, Not Facts, Fueled the Insurance Crisis?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 15
(reporting the results of a study conducted for the American Bar Foundation by Stephen
Daniels, Professor of Sociology at Northwestern University, which revealed that although
punitive damage awards greater than $1.0 million have generated tremendous publicity,
the median award for punitive damages throughout the country is actually less than
$50,000).
19. See Forbes, Fact and Comment, FORBES, Jan. 27, 1986, at 17 (commentary relying on
three examples of excessive judgments as justification for tort reform legislation). See also,
Sky High Damage Suits, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 27, 1986, at 35-39, 42, 43. In a
cover story citing increased filings of product liability cases, criticism is directed toward
such litigation and the corresponding bankruptcies of asbestos and IUD (intrauterine de-
vice) manufacturers. Although the article details the financial hardship incurred by these
large corporations, no mention is made of the human victims of these products. The tone
of the article is thusly demonstrated: "Anyone from Uncle Sam to Uncle Harry is open to
suit, now that the mood of society is to seek a culprit for all of life's mishaps." Id. at 36.
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dia) as to the actual amount of the final results. This incomplete report-
ing and observation contributes to the misperception that excessive
personal injury awards are proliferating in our society.
In addition to the media, plaintiffs' lawyers have also contributed in
no small measure to this misperception in the last decade. First, law-
yers, not unlike others, like to brag about their significant victories.
Some rush immediately to the newspapers and television stations to
trumpet successes. Others report exceptional or outstanding results to
such information-gathering organizations as Jury Verdict Research, Inc.
("JVR"). 2° Again, not unlike others, lawyers are loath to report their
dismissals, humiliating lost cases, or merely modest triumphs. Conse-
quently, JVR only receives notice of the largest awards and the most
sensational judgments, without further determining how much money
was actually paid. As a result, JVR averages are flawed, distorted and
exaggerated, and are misused by the insurance industry to influence
premiums, jurors and state legislators.
2 1
A second way that lawyers have fueled the misperceptions sur-
rounding the civil justice system has been through the use of the ad
damnum clause. 2 2 Because the amount or demand set forth in this clause
often bears no relationship to the true value of a particular case, the
misperception that large suits are proliferating has been aggravated.
Finally, incidents occurring after the Bhopal disaster 2 3 and the
tragic Dallas/Fort Worth air crash 24 cause the public to stereotype all
plaintiffs' attorneys as avaricious vultures who rush to the scene of a dis-
aster seeking clients. This impression is inaccurate and unfortunate.
In light of the misperceptions created by the media and by some
attorneys, the insurance industry has found it convenient to blame the
civil justice system generally, and to indict plaintiffs' lawyers specifically,
for the rising cost and shrinking availability of insurance in the "Great
Insurance Crisis of 1986."25 This tactic has been very successful; the al-
leged "crisis" provided impetus for the tort reform movement of 1986-
87, which resulted in thirty-nine states passing some type of reform
20. JVR is a legal publishing company which collects verdict information, analyzes
personal injury litigation, and performs personal injury case evaluations for subscribers.
21. Of 472 verified cases involving judgments of $1.0 million or more obtained by
JVR and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, 110 were unusable because there
was no response from the attorney of record, the verdicts were confidential, or for a vari-
ety of other reasons. MILLION DOLLAR VERDIcrs, supra note 12 at i, 2.
22. The ad damnum clause informs an adversary of the maximum amount of the claim
asserted without constituting proof of injury or of liability. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 35
(5th ed. 1979).
23. On December 3, 1984, more than 2,000 people died and tens of thousands were
injured as a result of a deadly gas leak from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India.
24. On August 2, 1985, windshear slammed a Delta L-101 I jet to the ground short of
the runway at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, killing 137. Washington Post, Aug.
4, 1985, at Al.
25. Sorry, Your Insurance Has Been Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16-20, 23-26; Liabil-
ity Insurance Skyrockets, Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1985, at KI, K7-8. These articles cite the
huge increases in insurance premiums experienced by, to name a few, day care centers,
physicians and athletic equipment manufacturers.
6451988]
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legislation.26
II. FALLACIES OF THE "INSURANCE CRISIS"
A. Failed Investments by the Insurance Industry
For the several-year period prior to the "crisis," the prop-
erty/casualty insurance companies had been underpricing their com-
mercial line policies in order to raise funds that could be invested so as
to take advantage of escalating interest rates. 2 7 This ability to offset un-
derwriting losses with portfolio investment income and income from
other sources has long been a significant factor in how insurance compa-
nies determine what they will charge for the insurance they offer. And
previously, insurance companies had been able to supplement any pre-
mium shortfall with such investment income. In the mid-1980's how-
ever, when interest rates unexpectedly fell, investment income did not
meet expectations; the companies panicked and attempted to even
things out in a single year. Accordingly, insurance premiums were
raised several-hundred percent,2 8 and policies were cancelled in areas
which underwriters perceived as being too risky. 2 9 Then, in response to
protests from their insureds, the insurance industry launched a multi-
million dollar advertising campaign to convince the American public
that excessive litigiousness and exorbitant jury awards 30 were to blame
for the premium increases and the unavailability of insurance coverage.
As a result, hundreds of enterprises, including day care centers, manu-
facturing concerns, governmental units and asbestos-removal compa-
nies, were left without insurance. 3 1 In reality, premiums increased and
26. Priest, Tort Reform Leislation. .. Is Only a Start, Wall St.J., Feb. 3, 1987, at 26, col.
5.
27. A property/casualty insurance company basically derives its income from under-
writing gains (the excess of premiums over claims and expenses) and investment gains.
Because of income from investment gains, a company can have net income even though its
premium revenues might not cover claims and expenses. Accordingly, for the past several
years property/casualty insurers charged relatively low premium prices, thereby generat-
ing increased business and a larger short-term, net cash flow. These monies were then
invested and the profit from investment income was used to satisfy any deficiency in pre-
mium income. In 1983, for instance, the industry's claims and expenses exceeded premi-
ums, resulting in a loss of about $11.0 billion, but because of its pricing strategy and
investment income, the industry had a net gain of about $8.0 billion. See Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the Ways and Means Comm., 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 108, 111 (1986)
(testimony of William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office). For a discussion of risk in the property/casualty insurance business,
see J. HUNTER & J. WILSON, INVESTMENT INCOME AND PROFITABILITY IN PROP-
ERTY/CASUALTY RATEMAKING Chapter 5 (1983).
28. Premiums Soaring as Insurance Crisis Begins to Hit Home, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 20,
1985, at BI.
29. Sugawara, Day Care Insurance Imperiled, Washington Post, July 19, 1985, at C7, col.
1 (insurance for day care centers has become prohibitively expensive or unavailable).
30. In five different advertisements the Insurance Information Institute urged readers
to write for a free booklet on reforming the civil justice system. This course of action was
described as necessary to control increasing premiums and cancellation of policies. INSUR-
ANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE LAwsurr CRISIS (Apr. 1986).
31. See The Manufactured Crisis, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1986, at 544 (reporting that
the "crisis" was caused by the insurance companies' poor management and investment
practices, not by the civil justice system. Additionally, the article points out that analyzing
646 [Vol. 64:4
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coverage became unavailable because the industry was reeling from mis-
managed investments and retreating interest rates.
B. The Special Problems of Medical Malpractice
One significant area that has not escaped the effects of the insur-
ance company panic is the health care industry. Doctors and other
health care providers have been drastically affected by extraordinary in-
creases in malpractice premiums. 3 2 The medical-malpractice problem is
further aggravated by the way in which insurance premiums for the med-
ical profession are determined. Unlike other categories of insureds,
there is no experience rating among individual physicians.3 3 Instead,
groups or "pools" of health care providers are collectively rated. As a
result, the best obstetrician in town pays the same rate for insurance as
the worst. This system penalizes competent physicians.
Additional problems are caused by the relatively small numbers of
doctors making up any particular underwriting risk pool. In Wisconsin,
for example, only forty-nine neurosurgeons comprise one underwriting
pool; three hundred obstetricians makeup another.3 4 Obviously, a sin-
gle claim-against only one errant doctor could adversely affect the pre-
miums of every doctor in the pool. As a result of this system, good
doctors are forced to pay higher premiums because a colleague, over
whom they have no control, has made a serious error. Moreover, there
has been a woeful lack of discipline prescribed for incompetent doc-
tors. 3 5 Studies in several states consistently show that one percent or
less of practicing physicians are responsible for twenty-five to thirty per-
cent of all losses paid.36 And yet, many of these doctors continue to
average awards is misleading because a few disproportionately large awards throw off any
average. Instead, it is the median award "that shows how the typical injured person is com-
pensated." Id. at 546).
As an interesting historical note, during the insurance crisis of the mid-1970's, as in-
surance companies lobbied for tort reform, several commentators blamed the crisis on the
insurance companies' need for high premiums due to poor investments. See generally D.
LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 20.07, n.56 (Supp. 1979); Aitken, Medi-
cal Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 637 INS. L.J. 90, 96 (1976); Oster, Medical
Malpractice Insurance, 45 INS. COUNS. J. 228, 231 (1978); Koskoff, Physician Insure Thyself,
TRIAL, Dec. 1979, at 4.
32. See, e.g., Nelson, Medical Malpractice and the Transformation in Health Care Delivery, 17
CUMB. L. REV. 313 (1987) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the effects of rising pre-
miums and shrinking availability of insurance upon the health care industry).
33. See A. HOFFLANDER & B. NYE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
72 (1985).
34. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, FUND POPULATION BY ISO CODE AND PREMIUM CLASS
(1986).
35. See Brinkley, Should Doctors Be Given a More Thorough Examination?, N. Y. Times,
Nov. 10, 1985, at El0, col. 1. (After citing cases involving physician malpractice, this article
analyzes the limited extent to which governmental review of physician incompetence is
disclosed to the public.); see also Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New
York, Grand Jury Report, Report Concerning the Care and Treatment of a Patient and the Supervi-
sion of Interns and Junior Residents at a Hospital in New York County, Dec. 31, 1986 (Supervi-
sion has been lacking and New York is responding by taking measures to increase the
supervision of student doctors caring for patients).
36. Medicine on Trial: The Malpractice Crisis, Case Study Finds When and lVhy, Orlando
Sentinel, Apr. 13, 1986, at AI, col. 1.
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practice.
C. The Insurance Industry is Strong and Profitable
The true financial status of the insurance industry in no way resem-
bles the pathetic picture described by industry spokespersons. The in-
dustry has mislead the American consumer and media-in an
orchestrated fashion-by inflating the amounts actually paid on claims,
while at the same time underrepresenting the true profitability of the
industry as a whole. For example, congressional reports show median
awards to be, generally, only one-fifth the amount claimed by the insur-
ance companies in their propaganda to justify insurance rate increases
and policy cancellations. 3 7 Further analysis indicates that these compa-
nies are undeserving of any sympathy or special consideration. To sup-
port this contention, one need only examine their financial condition.
The insurance industry reported record profits for 1986. Operating
profits were reported at $4.5 billion.3 8 Combined with their realized
capital gains and federal tax credits, the industry's net income was a rec-
ord $11.5 billion in 1986, which represented an increase of 605% over
the 1985 figure of $1.9 billion. 39 "Available industry estimates show
that over the next 5 years, the industry expects substantial net gains ...
[C]alculations, made from industry estimates, indicate an expected net
gain before taxes of more than $90 billion over the years 1986 to
1990. ' ' 40 In addition to the favorable treatment afforded the insurance
industry under the tax laws, it is important to remember that the indus-
try is also immune from federal antitrust regulation. 4 1 These sobering
and impressive facts make it absolutely clear that the insurance industry
is thriving. It certainly does not require, nor is it deserving of, the addi-
tional assistance which it seeks through enactment of legislative tort re-
form, at the expense of the legal rights of injured victims.
4 2
37. Report on the Liability Insurance Crisis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabili-
zation of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 171
(Aug. 6, 1986) (testimony of Philip J. Hermann, Chairman of the Board, Jury Verdict Re-
search, Inc.).
38. Casualty Firms Report Profit, Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1987, at C2. Operating profit
is investment income minus underwriting losses and other expenses. Underwriting losses
include not only money paid in actual claims but those amounts set aside for anticipated
claims. The latter sums are tax free and interest earning.
39. Id.
40. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 56 (1986) (testimony of William J.
Anderson, Director, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office).
41. Solutions to the Liability Insurance Crisis, 138 CONG. REC. H 1595 (daily ed. Mar. 25,
1986) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (In addition to criticizing the inflated statistics em-
ployed by the Insurance Services Office in raising premiums, LaFalce, in posing solutions
to the insurance crisis, has suggested that the antitrust exemption enjoyed by the insur-
ance industry under the McCarran-Ferguson Act be repealed or amended.)
42. Hunter & Angoff, Tort Reform Legislation . .. Ought to Reduce Premiums, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 3, 1987, at 26, col. 3 (additional support for the contention that insurance companies
need no additional legislative protections; in fact, these companies are now claiming that
tort reform will have a negligible effect on premium rates. For example, the St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company, while concluding that tort reforms "will produce little or
no savings to the tort system as it pertains to medical malpractice," was simultaneously
648 [Vol. 64:4
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III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AMERICAN TORT SYSTEM
The misperceptions and fallacies alluded to above are threatening
the essence of the American civil justice system. Coalitions have sprung
up all over the country,4 3 condemning the system and advocating radical
change. A lynch-mob psychology has set in-one that seeks to emascu-
late our tort compensation system, to eliminate our cherished seventh
amendment right to a jury trial, 44 and to significantly reduce the sub-
stantive rights of injured American citizens.
Many of these tort reform coalitions include people who really
know, or should know, the true value of our civil justice system, not only
as an effective way to compensate injured people, but also as a mecha-
nism to goad faceless corporations into shouldering social responsibili-
ties that outweigh an absolute yearning for profit.
The tremendous societal benefit provided by the tort system, in its
present form, should not be underemphasized. Personal injury law-
suits-not tough government regulations or self-discipline by con-
science-stricken corporations-forced the redesign of certain dangerous
products or their removal from the marketplace. Some of these lawsuits
revealed industrial conspiracies or exposed corporate coverups in addi-
tion to compensating the victims of such wrongful conduct. The fifty-
year conspiracy to coverup the hazards of asbestos was uncovered by a
handful of plaintiffs' lawyers who brought this evidence to light on be-
half of their injured clients. 4 5 A contraceptive device, marketed as the
"Dalkon Shield," was known to be unsafe but was manufactured and
sold anyway, until lawsuits forced it off the market. 46 The continued
manufacture and installation of the poorly designed Ford Pinto gas tank
was another example of a calculated corporate strategy exposed by
plaintiffs' lawyers doing their job in our civil justice system. 47 Other
examples include the redesign of the Drano can,4 8 the effort to keep
threatening to withdraw from the West Virginia medical-malpractice market. The reason
for this threat was the legislature's failure to pass legislation significantly limiting damages
for pain and suffering or restricting joint and several liability. Id.)
43. See American Tort Reform Association, A CivilJustice System Out of Balance, Press
Release (Jan. 16, 1986).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.
45. P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT - THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
(1985) (asbestos-related diseases were known forty years before the Manville Corporation
claimed that the adverse health consequences of such exposure was known, and much
earlier in Europe. Id. at 10-14).
46. M. MiNTz, AT ANY COST - CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD
(1985) (a detailed analysis of the A. H. Robins Company, manufacturers and marketers of
the Dalkon Shield).
47. Pinto gas tanks, when struck from the rear, had a high failure rate resulting in
frequent violent explosions. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 777,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361 (1981) (Ford management based its decision to go forward with
the production of the Pinto, knowing that the gas tank design was unsafe, on the profit
which would result from omitting or delaying the necessary "fixes").
48. See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969).
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flammable children's pajamas from the marketplace, 49 and the redesign
of gas tank caps on tractors. 50 The tort system and plaintiffs' lawyers are
largely responsible for these accomplishments; lives have no doubt been
saved, and injuries lessened.
CONCLUSION
Critics of the civil justice system, even if they acknowledge that
some social benefits are derived from the system, still complain about
the cost of delivering justice. They also complain that the process is pon-
derous and time-consuming. Whatever its faults and costs, our system
ofjustice, not unlike our democratic form of government, is immeasura-
bly better than any known alternative. The right to a court hearing is as
treasured as the right to vote, the right to bear arms and the right to
freedom of religion. People in the Soviet Union do not concern them-
selves with the cost of compensation systems. Victims of the Chernobyl
nuclear accident do not even consider obtaining compensation from ju-
ries of their peers. And yet, some in this country advocate reducing the
rights of our citizens.
Is the tort system perfect? No. Can it stand some fine tuning? Yes.
Should there be some alternatives to courts for some categories of
cases? Absolutely. And what about the lawyers? Plaintiffs' lawyers who
prosecute meritless or frivolous lawsuits should be dealt with severely
through sanctions by the bar associations. 5 1 Defense lawyers who pres-
ent frivolous defenses or unnecessary delays should be treated simi-
larly. 52  And lawyers who charge excessive fees should also be
disciplined by the bar associations and the supervising courts in the re-
spective states.
53
The faults of our tort system and its players, like the supposed eco-
nomic plight of the insurance companies, are greatly exaggerated. In
both instances, there is a problem of myth versus fact. Hopefully, the
leaders of the various bar associations in the United States will help the
public to distinguish fact from fiction, truth from distortion and myth
from reality. This kind of educational process is imperative if we ever
hope to lead the American citizenry to a realization that our civil justice
system is working. In the meantime, while this educational process is
evolving, we must guard against the continued erosion of individual
legal rights for the sake of protecting the purses of wealthy and influen-
tial special interests: the profitable insurance companies, the manufac-
turers of dangerous products, and the negligent providers of vital
services.
49. See, e.g., GRYC v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980); Weems v.
CBS Imports Corp., 46 Or. App. 539, 612 P.2d 323 (1980).
50. See, e.g., San Antonio v. Mendoza, 532 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
51. ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE As-
SOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA ON FRIVOLOUS COURT ACTIONS, CONTINGENCY
FEES, INFLATED DAMAGE CLAIMS, CLIENT SOLICITATION, AND LAWYER ADVERTISING (1986).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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